14 Mai When Oscar loses his tail the resulting creature is certainly a dog
2.3 The Paradox of 101 Dalmatians
Is Oscar-minus verso dog? Why then should we deny that Oscar-minus is verso dog? We saw above that one possible response to Chrysippus‘ paradox was esatto claim that Oscar-minus does not exist at \(t’\). But even if we adopt this view, how does it follow that Oscar-minus, existing as it does at \(t\), is not a dog? Yet if Oscar-minus is a dog, then, given the norma account of identity, there are two dogs where we would normally count only one. Mediante fact, for each of Oscar’s hairs, of which there are at least 101, there is a proper part of Oscar – Oscar minus per hair – which is just as much verso dog as Oscar-minus.
There are then at least 101 dogs (and durante fact many more) where we would count only one. Some claim that things such as dogs are “maximal. One might conclude as much simply sicuro avoid multiplying the number of dogs populating the space reserved for Oscar aureola. But the maximality principle may seem sicuro be independently justified as well. When Oscar barks, do all these different dogs bark durante unison? If per thing is a dog, shouldn’t it be capable of independent action? Yet Oscar-minus cannot act independently of Oscar. Nevertheless, David Lewis (1993) has suggested per reason for counting Oscar-minus and all the 101 dog parts that differ (mediante various different ways) from one another and Oscar by a hair, as dogs, and mediante fact as Dalmatians (Oscar is per Dalmatian).
Lewis invokes Unger’s (1980) “problem of the many. His hairs loosen and then dislodge, some such remaining still sopra place. Hence, within Oscar’s compass at any given time there are congeries of Dalmatian parts sooner or later puro become definitely Dalmatians; some sopra a day, some mediante a second, or per split second. It seems arbitrary onesto proclaim verso Dalmatian part that is verso split second away from becoming definitely verso Dalmatian, a Dalmatian, while denying that one per day away is verso Dalmatian. As Lewis puts it, we must either deny that the “many” are Dalmatians, or we must deny that the Dalmatians are many. Lewis endorses proposals of both types but seems puro favor one of the latter type according onesto which the Dalmatians are not many but rather “almost one” Sopra any case, the standard account of identity seems unable on its own esatto handle the paradox of 101 Dalmatians.
It requires that we either deny that Oscar minus verso hair is a dog – and per Dalmatian – or else that we must affirm that there is a multiplicity of Dalmatians, all but one of which is incapable of independent action and all of which bark durante unison no more loudly than Oscar barks macchia.
2.4 The Paradox of Constitution
Suppose that on day 1 Jones purchases per piece of clay \(c\) and fashions it into per statue \(s_1\). On day 2, Jones destroys \(s_1\), but not \(c\), by squeezing \(s_1\) into a ball and fashions per new statue \(s_2\) out of \(c\). On day 3, Jones removes a part of \(s_2\), discards it, and replaces it using per new piece of clay, thereby destroying \(c\) and replacing it by a new piece of clay, \(c’\). Presumably, \(s_2\) survives this change. Now what is the relationship between the pieces of clay and the statues they “constitute?” Per natural answer is: identity. On day \(1, c\) is identical sicuro \(s_1\) and on day \(2, c\) is identical puro \(s_2\). On day \(3, s_2\) is identical sicuro \(c’\). But this conclusion directly contradicts NI. If, on day \(1, c\) is (identical puro) \(s_1\), then it follows, given NI, that on day \(2, s_1\) is \(s_2\) (since \(c\) is identical to \(s_2\) on day 2) and hence that \(s_1\) exists on day 2, which it does not. By a similar argument, on day \(3, c\) is \(c’\) (since \(s_2\) is identical onesto both) and so \(c\) exists on day 3, which it does not. We might conclude, then, that either constitution is not identity or that NI is false. Neither conclusion is wholly welcome. Once we adopt the standard account less NI, the latter principle follows directly from the assumption that individual variables and constants durante quantified modal logic are sicuro be handled exactly as they are durante first-order logic. Ricerca dill mil And if constitution is not identity, and yet statues, as well as pieces of clay, are physical objects (and what else would they be?), then we are again forced onesto affirm that distinct physical objects ancora time. The statue \(s_1\) and the piece of clay \(c\) occupy the same space on day 1. Even if this is deemed possible (Wiggins 1980), it is unparsimonious. The canone account is thus precedentemente facie incompatible with the natural idea that constitution is identity.
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